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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper not only addresses how linkages, direct and facilitating linkages, can benefit microfinance institutions – and 
particularly in jurisdictions where the Savings Group Outreach involvement  is particularly low, but also illustrates ways 
and means whereby group lending and other more recent innovative methods used by micro lenders to secure 
repayments, could increase the desired effects, efficiency and impact of microfinance in selected jurisdictions. In so 
doing, it addresses some of the existing and persisting problems of micro finance in rural areas. 
 
An innovative aspect of the paper is evidenced through its recommendation of the Micro-Savings Requirement Scheme 
- which offers numerous benefits – as will be highlighted in this paper. 
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Role of Regulation in Micro Finance:  Jurisdictional Analysis 
 
      Marianne Ojo 
 
1. Background to the Study of the Role of Regulation in Micro Finance 
 
The basic issues underlying the impediments and challenges faced in microfinance relate particularly to those presented 
by risk and asymmetric information. Risk being partly attributed to inavailability of collaterals which can be secured by 
micro lenders and asymmetric information which also partly arises as a result of adverse selection. Both features are 
well known characteristics of financial regulation – the rationale for financial regulation being an embodiment of risk 
(that is, systemic risks) and asymmetric information. The type of „risk“ associated with microfinance stems largely from 
uncertainty. Even though risk and uncertainty are frequently used interchangeably, they are distinguished from each 
other based on their capability of being quantified. Risk is a term usually considered to be more capable of being 
quantified while uncertainty is also a form of risk which is to a larger extent, considered to be unquantifiable.
1
 Group 
lending, widely acknowledged to be an underlying and defining feature of microfinance, is an innovation which has 
been proposed to address the challenges relating to the need to facilitate repayments being made to the microlender 
whilst financial linkages have also evolved as a means of addressing problems presented from a lack of formal 
institutions operating within rural areas.  
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 An array of approaches has been used in the African microfinance industry - ranging from traditional group 
based systems to specialised lending by banks, by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), non bank financial 
institutions, cooperatives, rural banks, savings and postal financial institutions.
2
 The majority of microfinance 
efforts and institutions in Africa operate in the informal sector and it was only in the 1990s, with the 
intervention of international cooperative movements and specialized NGOs that microfinance was able to 
reach more clients in Africa – such as the one million clients which exist in Ethiopia.3 
 
Given the above statement, as well as figures and facts which support the evidence that a huge component of 
microfinance activities in Africa revolve round the informal sector, the role of regulation immediately becomes 
apparent. Without regulation, huge challenges are certainly and most likely to be presented to the microfinance industry 
in respect of the rationales for the embodiment of financial regulation – that is, issues relating to risks and information 
asymmetries. 
 
 
According to Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch,
4
 „the absence of formal credit institutions in village economies is 
often attributed to agency problems
5
 – which are accentuated when individuals cannot offer seizable collateral, and 
when legal enforcement mechanisms are weak.“ 
 
The above statement therefore also illustrates the link between the issue relating to an inability to provide collaterals, as 
well as that relating to the agency problem of asymmetric information. Even though such innovations as group lending 
                                                 
1 „Risk is traditionally associated with probability calculation – which suggests that an event can be predicted and 
controlled. Uncertainty, however, is not capable of measurement and deals with possibilities incapable of calculation 
which are based on guesswork and judgement.“ (Gray and Hamilton, 2006:20) 
2 (African Development Bank, 2006: v) 
3 Ibid at page 3 
4 (2005:36) 
5 In this sense, three types of agency problems are presented by Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, namely: Firstly, 
the lender having little if any, reliable information about the quality of the borrower (prior to extending a loan); 
secondly , once the grant of the loan has occurred, the lender does not know entirely how the borrower will use the 
resources; and thirdly, the lender's inability to verify the magnitude of the returns – once the investment returns have 
been realized. See ibid  
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and financial linkages have gone a huge way to address underlying issues in microfinance, several inefficiencies in the 
form of high transaction costs (and a proper understanding of what resources and products are most beneficial to 
microfinance clients in rural areas) still persist.  According to CARE,
6
 some of the reasons why  past efforts involving 
group linkage has been quite challenging include not only the fact that products have been inappropriate to meet the 
needs of group members, but also other factors embracing a lack of consideration by linkages of the structure or 
operating principles of savings groups, as well as a lack of unanimous agreements between group members. 
 
 1.2 Objectives of the Study 
 
As a result of the above mentioned persisting challenges still being encountered in microfinance, the aims and 
objectives of this research are as follows: 
 To investigate how linkages, both direct and facilitating linkages, can benefit microfinance institutions in 
Africa – and particularly countries such as the Central Africa Republic, Eritrea, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria and 
Somalia, where the Savings Group Outreach involvement  is particularly low when compared to other African 
countries. 
 To illustrate ways and means whereby group lending and other more recent innnovative methods used by 
micro lenders to secure repayments could increase the desired effects, efficiency and impact of microfinance in 
the above mentioned African countries – and particularly address some of the existing and persisting problems 
of micro finance in rural areas. 
 To incorporate the role of regulation in achieving the desired effects of microfinance – in particular, in respect 
of asymmetric information (agency problems), as well as in mitigating risks emanating from the lack of 
collaterals in microfinance.   
 
1.3 Research Methodology and Design of the Study 
 
The research adopts a predominantly analytical, qualitative approach, as well as comparative approach  in arriving at the 
results and findings of the study, and also  in drawing conclusions and recommendations for further study. The section, 
immediately following the introduction, considers economic theories as well as other literature on the study which have 
shaped the present literature on the topic. Not only does it aim to explore why there is still an existing gap in the 
literature,namely, why many rural parts in Africa have no access to microfinance facilities, it also proposes a means 
whereby such a gap can be mitigated or eliminated. It will have recourse to present innovations in microfinance, as well 
as incorporate the economic theories discussed in the section in proposing a scheme which should assist in mitigating (if 
not totally eliminating) the present gaps in the literature. The approach adopted in the study will then be considered 
before the findings and conclusions to the study are arrived at. 
 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
Incentives which are aimed at encouraging formal and less formal institutions to engage on a greater scale, in direct and 
facilitating linkage arrangements should focus on practices which would facilitate better corporate governance 
measures. Such incentives including shares or stock options for the Board and management of these institutions – since 
results from empirical based research have revealed that such agents are more likely to serve the interests of the 
principal better where their interests are tied up in the firm's shares. Such incentives, however, should be long term 
based – rather than short term since greater risks may be taken by such agents where they are compensated and 
rewarded on a short term basis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
6 (CARE, 2011: 39) 
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1.5 Scope of the Study 
 
Owing to the extant literature on the topic, as well as findings which have revealed that low income clients would rather 
build and consolidate on assets which help in reducing risk before they start incurring debt, micro savings has been 
focused on. Very little reference has been made to micro insurance – hence this area is strongly recommended as a 
suggested future research area in considering its impact and importance to rural inhabitants in their quest to obtain 
micro credit facilities. 
 
 
 
2. Review of the Literature  
 
As highlighted in the previous section, even though such innovations as group lending and financial linkages have gone 
a huge way to address underlying issues in microfinance, several inefficiencies in the form of high transaction costs 
(and a proper understanding of what resources and products are most beneficial to microfinance clients in rural areas) 
still persist. This section aims to address issues which have contributed to inefficiencies which, in turn, have 
accentuated the difficulties and challenges faced by rural inhabitants in gaining access to microfinance facilities. 
Further, the section aims to contribute to the literature on the current topic by proposing new schemes and arrangements 
whereby such innovations as group lending and financial linkages could be optimised and implemented with greater 
efficiency as well as with the aim of generating more beneficial results. 
 
2.1 Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks 
 
Micro finance is defined as „banking and/or financial services which are targeted at low-and-moderate income 
businesses or households – including the provision of credit.“7 A microfinance institution is also considered to be „a 
financial institution which could be a non profit organisation, regulated financial institution or commercial bank which 
provides microfinance products and services to low- income clients.“8  
 
Implementing case study methods, Pagura and Kirsten (2006) embarked upon the quest to improve an understanding of 
financial linkages which is aimed at improving rural access to savings, insurance, money transfer and payment services, 
as well as credit.
9
 
 
Over the past recent years, an increasing number of formal institutions have entered into and engaged themselves in 
collaborative relationships with less formal institutions. Such relationships could be based on direct financial linkages 
and facilitating linkages. 
 
 
Direct financial linkages are considered to be „linkages between financial institutions whose main purpose of the 
linkage is to help less formal institutions diversify their sources of funding“10 whilst  
facilitating linkages are „linkages between institutions in which the formal institutions hires the less formal institutions 
to act on its behalf.“ Cases which were used by Pagura and Kirsten to illustrate such collaborative relationships include 
those from:
11
 
                                                 
7 (African Development Bank,  2006 : iii) 
8 ibid 
9 (Pagura and Kirsten, page 3 of 15). According to them, „successful cases in Bolivia, Costa Rica, Honduras, India, 
Kenya, Mali, Peru, the Phillippines, Rwanda and Tanzania were selected because of the following factors: 
 - Such cases demonstrated success in expanding access to under-served rural market segments; 
 - They were based on cost covering principles or had clear exit strategies (if they were externally supported); 
 - They had been in existence for two or more years 
 - They added to the diversity of linkages types.“see ibid at page 4 
10 See ibid at page 5 
11 For an in-depth analysis of case studies on these countries, see ibid at page 8 
 6  
 India (ICICI Bank, India's second largest commercial bank's partnership with MFIs in several „unique ways to 
extend credit directly“ to Self Help Groups in rural areas); 
  Mali (where the Banque Nationale de Developpement Agricole ,BNDA, is said to have a „long history of 
serving less formal institutions through bulk loans and lines of credit as well as savings accounts“ to help 
institutions  address cash flow and portfolio expansion projects. 
 Indonesia: Where the Bank Pembangunan Daerah (BPD) is acredited with playing „a significant parenting role 
for customary village banks“ (LPDs) through the provision of services which include staff training, 
monitoring, as well as supervisory services. The BPD is also involved in providing LPDs with savings and 
loans services which are aimed at assisting smaller institutions in managing their liquidity more effectively. 
 The Phillippines: Where  „government owned apex organisation“ PCFC, is involved in a partnership with 
several microfinance actors through the provision of wholesale credit and training to such institutions. 
 Honduras: Covelo, a „private first and second tier organisation“ provides loans and lines of credit in bulk 
quantities, to MFIs as well as contributes immensely in the consolidation of internal systems and controls 
which are aimed improving self-regulation mechanisms.  
 Costa Rica: Where the promotion of the incorporation of village banks in the late 1990s by Finca-Costa Rica, a 
move which was instrumental in „paving the way for all units in the network to establish relationships with 
commercial lines of credit and otehr financial services“, is highlighted. 
 
2.2 Global and Jurisdictional Challenges Encountered by Microfinance 
 
As highlighted under the introductory section, basic issues underlying the impediments and challenges faced in 
microfinance relate particularly to those presented by risk and asymmetric information. Other challenges which are 
more jurisdiction-specific, and with particular respect to microfinance in Africa, include:
12
 
 The absence of strong retail capacity in microfinance institutions (this being considered to be the single largest 
constraint in the expansion of outreach of financial services to the poor in Africa; 
 Extension of access to financial services to the remotest of rural areas in a cost effective manner; 
 The impression that microfinance is a social system of resource transfers to „beneficiaries“ at subsidized 
interest levels, rather than a part of the financial sector – such impression being considered as an explanatory 
factor to why „national enabling environments“ still restrict MFIs from transferring and moving savings;   
 Infrastructure required for microfinance – such infrastructure including training services and facilities, 
information technologies, credit bureaus. 
Given the relatively low  Savings Group Outreach involvement (see Table 1) in countries such as the CAR, Eritrea, 
Guinea Bissau, Nigeria and Somalia, where the Savings Group Outreach involvement (see Table 1) is particularly low 
when compared to other African countries, it can generally be inferred that there are huge problems and challenges 
faced in microfinance as regards access to microfinance facilities by rural clients. 
As well as providing the explanation why more than 80% of all households in developing countries do not have access 
to institutional banking services because they lack the collateral to secure loans from formal financial institutions, 
Okpara (2009) also adds that, empirically, there are four major critical factors inhibiting the performance of banks in 
Nigeria and these are:
13
 
 Undue Interference from Board Members 
 Political Crises 
 Undercapitalization 
 Fraudulent Practices 
Further as documented by the Central Bank of Nigeria, „despite decades of public provision and direction of provision 
of micro credit, policy orientation, and the entry of new players, the supply of microfinance in Nigeria is still inadequate 
in relation to demand – suggesting that there is some inefficiency in microfinance operations in Nigeria due to some 
institutional inadequacies such as undercapitalization, inefficient management and regulatory and supervisory 
loopholes.“14  
                                                 
12 (African Development Bank,  2006: vii) 
13 (Okpara, 2009:  page 5 of 15) 
14 Adeyemi  (2008) Central Bank of Nigeria Bullion, 32(1) 26-34; cited in Ibid  
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3. Economic Theories Underlying Challenges Faced in Microfinance: Principal Agent Relationship, 
Asymmetric Information and the Problem of Incomplete Contracts. 
 
„Agency theory explains a mismatch of resources and abilities.“ (Armendáriz de Aghion and  Morduch, 2005:47) 
 
This section is aimed at addressing how such a „mismatch of resources and abilities“ can be addressed. It will also seek 
to illustrate how the above-mentioned components, namely, principal agent relationship, asymmetric information, and 
the issue relating to incomplete contracts are linked. Asymmetric information being a feature of many agency 
relationships and necessitating a role of monitoring on the part of the principal. If the contracts between a principal and 
the agent were designed in such a way that it was a „complete“15 contract , it would reduce the scope at which the agent 
is encouraged to act in ways which support his personal interests and goals. However, since a degree of flexibility is 
required in the design of such contracts, it is inevitable that they end up being „incomplete“. Even in formal financial 
institutions where regular monitoring and regulation is carried out, principal agency problems arising from incomplete 
contracts still arise. For this reason it is vital to incorporate some elements of such formalised institutions, namely 
monitoring and regulation, into the activities of less formalised institutions. Hence, this section considers exclusively 
how regulation could be better incorporated into microfinance via formal institutions. 
As highlighted under the introductory section, the issue of asymmetric information is a very probable and likely 
characteristic of microfinance institutions in Africa given the fact most microfinance activities revolve round the 
informal sector – hence the likelihood that such activities will be subject to monitoring, enforcement and sanctions are 
very low. Furthermore, in the absence of monitoring, supervision and enforcement, certain consequences, namely those 
highlighted in the previous section, that is, undercapitalization, fraudulent practices, inefficient management and 
regulatory and supervisory loopholes, are likely and inevitable consequences. 
 
 
Regulation is therefore to be regarded as a necessary and vital component which should be incorporated into the design 
of microfinance activities and contracts. Another common and recurring challenge faced by many financial institutions 
– which has deterred such institutions from engaging themselves in microfinance activities in rural areas relates to high 
transaction costs. The „relatively“ high cost of lending in rural areas is attributed to „low population densities combined 
with low loan volume, poor transportation and communication facilities – which make unit delivery costs very high for 
small financial transactions“16 as well as for larger institutions that frequently operate in urban areas. 
 
Hence if regulation is to be incorporated into microfinance via formal institutions, it should be done through a vehicle 
and design which is not only aimed at facilitating greater monitoring, enforcement and supervision within the process 
but aimed at cost reduction for such institutions involved – be they  formal or less formal institutions – particularly in 
rural areas. 
 
An institutional arrangement and design which would facilitate the reduction of transaction costs for those institutions 
involved would not only help incorporate greater efficiency into the process, but should also provide clients with a 
wider range of products and services to choose from – products and services which would, more importantly, meet their 
needs. Furthermore, the design should be targeted at incorporating regulation, monitoring and supervisory activities at 
minimal cost for those institutions involved. Since information asymmetries are usually a typical feature of principal 
agent relationships, it is to be expected that some degree of monitoring will be necessary – particularly given the 
presence of externalities. 
 
                                                 
15 It is frequently argued that the principal agent problem would not arise if it were possible to write a complete 
contract – however it is also added that complete contracts are unfeasible since it is impossible to foresee or describe 
all future contingencies. (Maher and Andersson, 1999: 6) 
16 „As a result, it is not worth the substantial investment required to move into rural areas – as regards such larger 
institutions, and for this reason, in many African countries, the providers of rural finance are smaller locally based 
institutions.“ (African Development Bank, 2006:6) 
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Theories and concepts relating to adverse selection and moral hazard have commonalities owing to the fact that risk is 
inherent in both. Adverse selection, an economical phenomenon which is said to occur when „banks cannot easily 
determine which customers are likely to be more risky than others (hence preferring to charge riskier customers more 
than safer customers in order to compensate for the probability of default), is also considered to be instrumental in 
frequently driving safer customers out of the credit market – since the bank is not certain of who is who and in the 
process, raises interest rates for everyone.“17 
 
Another phenomenon, which occurs where bank clients are prone to take higher risks with their investments – 
especially owing to the fact that they are insured, which is also highlighted by Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch
18
, is 
moral hazard. Such problems attributed to moral hazard and adverse selection, according to Armendáriz de Aghion and 
Morduch, could be „potentially eliminated“ if banks were able to engage in affordable means of gathering and 
evaluating information on their clients, as well as enforcing contracts.
19
 
 
 
Given the major challenges presented by the inability of some microfinance clients to present collaterals, and the level 
of risk this presents to micro lenders, micro savings should constitute the primary basis of providing microfinance to 
any rural client who cannot provide collateral to obtain microfinance in the first instance. 
 
Such an affordable means of  „gathering and evaluating information on their clients, as well as enforcing contracts, 
could be achieved through the arrangement of direct or facilitating linkages between formal and less formal institutions. 
In this sense, an allocation of resources can be achieved in such a way which is aimed at maximising efficiency as well 
as minimising costs. Such an arrangement/scheme (which will be referred to as the Micro Savings Requirement 
Scheme) is introduced as follows: 
 
 
4. The Design of Contracts Between Formal and Less Formal Financial Institutions and the Role of 
Corporate Governance: The Micro Savings Requirement Scheme 
 
Where a client has been saving with an institution for at least three years and is capable of demonstrating a steady and 
acceptable level and source of income with such an institution, preferably, a less formal unregulated institution such as 
self help groups, farmers' organisation, women's organisations, savings banks and NGOs, such a client should be 
compensated in form of an incentive – such incentive being provided by the institution which will eventually serve as 
microlender or provide a greater proportion of the micro lending funds (usually the more formal institution will be 
expected to provide more funding). The incentives could assume the form of financial backing – that is, an assurance 
that by saving with the less formal institution or bank, such clients would earn the prospects or possibility of getting the 
required microfinance after the three year period (or agreed period). 
 
Naturally, the savings generated after the three year period should constitute a reasonable and acceptable percentage of 
the credit that will be eventually granted by the micro lender. In such cases, linkages between institutions – be it through 
direct linkage or facilitated linkage, plays a huge and important role since collaboration between formal and less formal 
institutions also provides an efficient means of diversifying client risks. 
 
Where a client has retained a steady flow of savings over a desired and stipulated period of time with one of the 
institutions involved in the direct or facilitated linkage collaboration (such institution preferably being the less formal 
institution for instance, a village bank or savings club), the more formal institution should offer the guarantee of a grant 
of microfinance facility provided the savings generated over the required minimum period (with the less formal 
institution) constitutes an acceptable ratio which is considered reasonable enough for the more formal institution to 
offer such guarantee in granting the required micro credit facility to the client. 
 
                                                 
17 Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005:7) 
18 Ibid  
19 See ibid at page 8 
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The more formal institution is also able to incorporate the previously lacking supervision and monitoring activities into 
the process once the minimum required savings period has expired. This also incorporates a degree of cost efficiency 
into the process since, initially, when the client was saving, the less formal institution (where the client had his/her 
savings) had less reasons to monitor customer activities. This being the case since greater risk was borne by the client 
(and not the less formal bank/institution) in placing savings with the bank. 
 
However, with the expiration of the savings period and the fulfillment of conditions required to secure the grant of 
microfinance facility, the risk borne is now transferred to the more formal bank/institution – who in such a case is most 
likely to provide a greater proportion of the credit facility. Hence there will be greater need for the formal institution to 
instigate monitoring activities. 
 
The less formal institution is not obliged to commit more resources (hence incurring costs) towards monitoring 
activities and the more formal institution will simply be engaged in activities which it was previously well equipped and 
specialised to engage in – thereby ensuring that no extra costs are borne by the less formal institution (in engaging in 
additional monitoring responsibilities) – and therefore ensuring that a more efficient allocation of resources is facilitated 
and that an incident resulting in a „mismatch of resources and abilities“ is reduced. 
 
In determining the amount of risk that can be accepted or borne by such an institution, it could have regard to the 
amount of credit facility granted: relative to amount of savings in client's account, the loan repayments/loan repayment 
period, and other factors which could serve as indicators of the level of risk being assumed.  
 
The importance of designing a contract which accurately and appropriately reflects all that has been highlighted in this 
section so far, cannot be over emphasised. Furthermore, good corporate and governance measures and practices will 
need to be incorporated into the relationship between the formal and less formal financial institutions if they are to 
effectively and efficiently undertake and execute their tasks and responsibilities.  
 
 
Governance  structures, according to Maher and Andersson, can be regarded as „a mechanism for making decisions that 
have not been specified in the initial contract.“20 Furthermore they add that,21 corporate governance not only constitutes 
a key element of improving microeconomic efficiency, it strongly influences resource allocation, as well as the 
behaviour and performance of firms, innovative activity, entrepreneurship, and the development of an active SME 
sector.
22
 
 
Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch also argue that the inefficiencies of adverse selection can be mitigated through 
group lending. 
 The Grameen group lending contract works very differently than a standard banking contract for small 
business. In a standard relationship, the borrower gives the bank collateral as security, gets a loan from the 
bank, invests the capital to generate a return, and finally pays the loan back with interest. Since Grameen 
clients are often too poor to be able to offer collateral, the Grameen contract takes advantage of the client's 
close ties within their community. To take advantage of those relationships, the loan contract involves groups 
of customers, not individuals acting on their own. The groups form voluntarily, and, while loans are made to 
individuals within groups, all members are expected to support the others when difficulties arise.“ 
  
Even though group lending may serve as a greater means of enforcing repayment and the fulfillment of contractual 
terms and obligations, the benefits to be derived from a collaboration between formal and less formal institutions 
(through direct and facilitating linkages) within the context of clients who had no collaterals and initially had to start up 
through micro savings (in order to obtain the required microfinance facility), are definitely greater. Furthermore, the 
                                                 
20 This being particularly the case since many contracts are „incomplete“ contracts. (Maher and Andersson, 1999:6) 
21 Ibid at page 4  
22 „Poor corporate governance mechanisms in certain OECD countries“, it is further argued, „have proved, in part, to 
be a major impediment to improving the competitiveness of firms. It is also added that better corporate governance 
both within OECD and non OECD countries is capable of generating higher levels of economic growth. See ibid 
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establishment of group lending arrangements, whilst also incorporating the „joint liability condition“ and whilst 
facilitating enforcement, does not entirely or substantially address the issue relating to asymmetric information and 
agency problems.  
 
In addition to the Micro-Savings Requirement Scheme which has been illustrated and described in this section, other 
features of the Grameen group lending contract could also be incorporated into the contract between formal and less 
formal institutions – that is group lending and the „joint liability“ condition. However, this would not constitute a pre-
requisite for the Micro-Savings requirement. Individuals should be free and eligible to undertake such schemes. The 
difference between the Micro-Savings Requirement  Scheme which incorporates features of group lending and the 
„joint liability“ condition and the Grameen group lending contract would be the added advantage which the former has 
over the latter. That is, whilst the Micro-Savings Requirement Scheme (which incorporates features of group lending 
and the „joint liability“ condition) offers the added benefit of the client offering some „collateral“ (in the form of 
savings), a collateral is lacking in the Grameen group lending contract. 
 
CARE also emphasises the importance of microfinance institutions understanding the needs of „those very poor people, 
most of whom live in hard-to-reach places .“23 The importance of loan terms being adequately tailored to meet the 
intended use of the loan, principals which are not too large, loan terms which are not too short, installment payment 
systems which fit the cash flow of the investment, are also emphasised.
24
 
 
A number of reasons also proposed as contributory to why past efforts aimed at group linkage has been so challenging 
include the fact that „products have been inappropriate in meeting the needs of group members, linkage has not taken 
into account the structure or operating principles of savings groups, and that unanimous agreement among group 
members to link, has been lacking.“25 
 
 
5. Empirical Results and Findings on Corporate Governance 
 
The following conclusions and findings were derived by Bhagat and Bolton in accentuating their contribution to the 
literature on corporate governance:
26
 
 
 Better governance, as measured by GIM (the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick)27 and BCF28 (Bebchuk, Cohen and 
Ferrell) indices, stock ownership of board members, and Chief Executive Officer chair separation, is 
significantly positively correlated with better and subsequent operating performance; 
 That implications  of the above-mentioned finding on corporate governance include namely, the need for focus 
on stock ownership of board members in the aim and efforts to improve corporate governance – since in their 
opinion, corporate governance is not only positively correlated to future operating performance, but also the 
probability of disciplinary management turnover in poorly performing firms. 
 
It may then be asked or questioned: What are the rewards or compensation which would serve as incentives for those 
                                                 
23  See (CARE, 2011:39) 
24 ibid 
25  ibid 
26 (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008:271) 
27  GIM G Index: “The G-Index is constructed from data compiled by the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
("IRRC"), as described in Gompers, Ishii, Metrick (2003). A firm's score is based on the number of shareholder 
rights-decreasing provisions a firm has. The index ranges from a feasible low of 0 to a high of 24. A high G-Score is 
associated with weak shareholder rights, and a low G-Score is associated with strong shareholder rights.“ (Bhagat 
and Bolton, 2006: 34)  
28  BCF E-Index: „The E-Index is constructed from IRRC data as described in Bebchuk, Cohen, Ferrell (2004). It uses 
a 6-provision subset of the GIndex. The index ranges from a feasible low of 0 to a high of 6;a high score is 
associated with weak shareholder rights and alow score is associated with strong shareholder rights. (Bhagat and 
Bolton, 2006: 34)  
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formal and less formal financial institutions to engage in direct or facilitating linkage arrangements aimed at assisting 
rural inhabitants in gaining access to micro credit facilities – and with particular reference to the proposed Micro 
Savings Requirement Scheme? 
 
As highlighted earlier on in the section, less formal institutions gain advantages in that the more formal institutions 
undertake monitoring and supervisory activities after the savings period has expired – thus incorporating greater 
monitoring and enforcement into the process. The more formal institutions should also benefit from better corporate 
structure and governance arrangements - through their collaboration with the less formal institutions. There may, 
initially, appear to be some sceptism as regards this view – however greater accountability might be incorporated into 
the corporate governance process where two institutions (both the formal and less formal) are involved. Based on the 
empirical results of Bhagat and Bolton,
29
 as previously discussed, such improved better governance, should generate 
better performance results, hence greater profitability. 
 
Even assuming that the empirical results of Bhagat and Bolton are not taken into consideration, and that a collaboration 
between the less formal and formal institution (via direct or facilitating linkages) does not improve the governance 
structure of the formal institution, the formal financial institution would still benefit from the process if it generates 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports through which the general public and its extended stakeholders are able to 
view the positive contribution being made by the firm in improving the lives of those living in poverty through better 
access to microfinance facilities (micro savings and micro credit facilities inclusively). 
 
 
5.2 Recent Developments in Microfinance 
 
It is increasingly being acknowledged that microfinance and the provision of micro credit may not always offer the best 
solution in addressing the needs of the poor. Further, it is maintained that other strategies may serve to better address the 
issues of social exclusion and poverty.
30
 According to Rosset Cambier, a number of examples have been provided of 
combined microfinance schemes which have very low levels of outreach and are limited in their services owing to 
geographical, cultural or financial reasons.
31
 Further, he adds that there is need for „more thorough and formative 
evaluation approach to combined microfinance evaluation – which builds on lessons learned dealing with combined 
product design and implementation.“32 
Emerging trends also reveal that many micro lenders are adopting more flexible approaches in obtaining collaterals – 
particularly given the need and urgency to work more effectively in not so densely populated areas. Such trends 
include:
33
 
 Progressive Lending : „The practice of promising larger and larger loans to groups and individuals in good 
standing.“ It is also considered to enable the lender to „test“ borrowers with small loans at the start in order to 
screen out the worst prospects before expanding the magnitude of the loan.  
 Public repayments 
 Repayment schedules with weekly or monthly installments 
 Targeting of women 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29  (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008:271) 
30 (Rosset Cambier, 2004:21) 
31 ibid 
32 Ibid at page 22 
33 „Flexible approaches to collateral where what matters most, is the value that the customer attaches to losing the item 
– rather than the value that the lender expects to recover from selling the item.“ (Armendáriz de Aghion and 
Morduch, 2005: 119,125 and 142) 
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6. Research Methodology 
 
As indicated under the introductory section, the research will adopt a predominantly based qualitative and analytical 
approach in arriving at the results and findings of the study, as well as in drawing a conclusion and recommendations 
for further study.
 
Even though references will be made to empirical research, an analytical, as well as a comparative 
holistic perspective will primarily constitute the basis of the results and conclusion to the study. 
 
 
It will initially adopt a holistic/global based approach which will take into consideration approaches which have been 
adopted in other jurisdictions where similar issues have been addressed and whose outcomes have proved successful. 
The results generated from comparing results from different jurisdictions will then be applied at a more restrictive level, 
namely, on a regional basis, before it is narrowed down to a country specific basis. 
 
In adopting a holistic and global based approach, and incorporating the results from a case study,
34
 countries which have 
been selected and considered in this study are as follows: 
 
 India (where partnership was undertaken with MFIs in several „unique ways to extend credit directly“ to Self 
Help Groups in rural areas); 
  Mali (where  a „long history of serving less formal institutions through bulk loans and lines of credit as well as 
savings accounts“ to help institutions  address cash flow and portfolio expansion projects, considered). 
 Indonesia: Where the assumption of „a significant parenting role for customary village banks“ (LPDs) through 
the provision of services which include staff training, monitoring, as well as supervisory services, is taken into 
account.  
 The Phillippines: Where  „government owned apex organisation“, is involved in a partnership with several 
microfinance actors through the provision of wholesale credit and training to such institutions. 
 Honduras: Covelo, a „private first and second tier organisation“ provides loans and lines of credit in bulk 
quantities, to MFIs as well as contributes immensely in the consolidation of internal systems and controls 
which are aimed improving self-regulation mechanisms.  
 Costa Rica: Where the promotion of the incorporation of village banks in the late 1990s by Finca-Costa Rica, a 
move which was instrumental in „paving the way for all units in the network to establish relationships with 
commercial lines of credit and otehr financial services“, is highlighted. 
 
The above results derived from the case study by Pagura and Kirsten are those which have been selected and taken into 
account and applied at a narrower level  in drawing conclusions and recommendations for this research study. 
Furthermore, more recent developments, theoretical considerations (theories) and emerging trends will be incorporated 
into conclusions and recommendations derived for the study. 
 
 
 
7. Findings and Conclusion 
 
According to CARE,
35
 the products offered by MFIs to poor people are often not well suited to meet their needs. 
Furthermore, it is highlighted that MFIs often offer credit to those who are unable to afford such and who would rather 
save than have access to such credit.
36
 Findings from CARE also revealed that such low income clients would rather 
build and consolidate on assets which help in reducing risk before they start incurring debt.
37
 
                                                 
34  Pagura and Kirsten, page 3 of 15. According to them, successful cases in Bolivia, Costa Rica, Honduras, India, 
Kenya, Mali, Peru, the Phillippines, Rwanda and Tanzania were selected owing to specified factors. The countries 
have been narrowed down in the present study. 
35 (CARE, 2011: 9) 
36 ibid 
37 ibid 
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The beneficial features of the Micro Savings Requirement Scheme can also be illustrated through the collaborative 
arrangements between the formal and less formal institution via direct or facilitated linkages whose benefits have been 
illustrated – according to a case study which involved various jurisdictions such as India, Costa Rica, the Phillippines, 
Mali, Honduras, Indonesia. Such benefits include: 
 
 
 extending credit directly“ to Self Help Groups in rural areas 
 assisting  institutions  in addressing  cash flow and portfolio expansion projects 
  the provision of services which include staff training, monitoring, as well as supervisory services 
 the provision of wholesale credit and training to such involved institutions 
 contributing immensely in the consolidation of internal systems and controls which are aimed improving self-
regulation mechanisms.  
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Source: CARE, CARE-Access-Africa-Closing-the-Gap-2011 Microfinance in Africa: State of the Sector Report at page 12 
 
 
The above mentioned benefits, along with other benefits inherent in the proposed Micro Savings Requirement Scheme will 
be of immense benefit to microfinance in countries where access to microfinance in rural areas is severely restricted – and 
particularly in countries such as the CAR, Eritrea, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria and Somalia, where statistics reveal that the 
Savings Group Outreach involvement (see Table 1 above) is particularly low when compared to other African countries. 
 
 
 
Given the benefits of microfinance - as well as the needs and demands of those who are not able to afford collaterals and 
who would not wish to incur debt (before consolidating on assets which can be used in mitigating risk), the Micro Savings 
Requirement Scheme has been proposed. For micro lenders, it offers a more flexible approach and alternative to obtaining 
a collateral whilst also incorporating the options of having  features of group lending and the „joint liability“ conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 16  
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 
Source: Pagura, M. and  Kirsten, M. (2006) Formal Informal Financial Linkages – Lessons From Developing Countries 
at page 6  
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